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Background: Smart-home technologies, comprising environmental sensors, wearables and video are attracting
interest in home healthcare delivery. Development of such technology is usually justified on the basis of the
technology’s potential to increase the autonomy of people living with long-term conditions. Studies of the ethics of
smart-homes raise concerns about privacy, consent, social isolation and equity of access. Few studies have
investigated the ethical perspectives of smart-home engineers themselves. By exploring the views of engineering
researchers in a large smart-home project, we sought to contribute to dialogue between ethics and the
engineering community.
Methods: Either face-to-face or using Skype, we conducted in-depth qualitative interviews with 20 early- and mid-
career smart-home researchers from a multi-centre smart-home project, who were asked to describe their own
experience and to reflect more broadly about ethical considerations that relate to smart-home design. With
participants’ consent, interviews were audio-recorded, transcribed and analysed using a thematic approach.
Results: Two overarching themes emerged: in ‘Privacy’, researchers indicated that they paid close attention to
negative consequences of potential unauthorised information sharing in their current work. However, when discussing
broader issues in smart-home design beyond the confines of their immediate project, researchers considered physical
privacy to a lesser extent, even though physical privacy may manifest in emotive concerns about being watched or
monitored. In ‘Choice’, researchers indicated they often saw provision of choice to end-users as a solution to ethical
dilemmas. While researchers indicated that choices of end-users may need to be restricted for technological reasons,
ethical standpoints that restrict choice were usually assumed and embedded in design.
Conclusions: The tractability of informational privacy may explain the greater attention that is paid to it. However,
concerns about physical privacy may reduce acceptability of smart-home technologies to future end-users. While
attention to choice suggests links with privacy, this may misidentify the sources of privacy and risk unjustly burdening
end-users with problems that they cannot resolve. Separating considerations of choice and privacy may result in more
satisfactory treatment of both. Finally, through our engagement with researchers as participants this study
demonstrates the relevance of (bio)ethics as a critical partner to smart-home engineering.
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Smart-home technologies—technologies that interact
with the home occupier to remotely automate utilities
and appliances—exact interest in a range of domains.
While the concept of smart-homes has existed since the
1960s [1], the creation of inexpensive wireless devices and
powerful computers means that many observers see smart-
homes as an idea whose time has come [2, 3]. Interest in
smart-homes extends beyond automation for convenience
[4] to healthcare applications for older people [5]. A review
of technology by Tamura [6] describes using sensors on
doors, furniture and appliances, wearable devices and video
cameras. Such devices can make physiological measure-
ments, detect activity and inactivity, falls and other acci-
dents. Combined, the information from such devices can
track health related routines of smart-home occupants by
monitoring their patterns of daily living.
While more studies of smart-homes are focused on
the possibilities of data collection [7] than its ethical
limits, research has tried to understand the ethical impli-
cations of smart-home and related health technologies.
These studies commonly raise concerns about privacy,
but also suggest consent, social isolation [8] and equity
of access [9, 10] are major areas of concern. End-users
have been observed to allow their privacy to be compro-
mised if they perceive sufficient personal benefits, which
some scholars claim is a fair trade of privacy for in-
creased autonomy [11–13]. Others complain such a
compromise neither fosters end-user autonomy nor
avoids serious moral harms to personal agency [14, 15].
For example Brown and Adams [9] argue that perva-
sively observed and monitored individuals will find
themselves pressured to alter behaviours in line with
particular conceptions of health. While such arguments
can appeal to popular notions of personal responsibility,
there are good arguments to suggest health and ill-
health are normative concepts; [16] what is normal
health varies from one time or place to another—consi-
der, for instance, debates about criminal responsibility
and mental illness, [17] or changes in attitude toward
the status of homosexuality as a health aberration [18].
There are numerous instances germane to smart-homes
where provision of a diagnosis brings ethical consider-
ations to the fore. For instance, a diagnosis of dementia
raises questions about autonomy, and the suggestion
that an accident is a ‘fall’ is a label that may imply frailty
and decline. Whether ethical concepts common to bioeth-
ics are the most appropriate for discussion of new engineer-
ing technologies is the subject of some debate. Distinctive
ethical frameworks have arisen in the field of engineering.
Floridi has influentially argued that much of bioethical rea-
soning is “biocentric” and favours an ontological approach
to ethics that gives moral consideration to data entities on
bases other than whether or not they are biologically alive[19]. His view is not universally embraced, [20] although
the need for new forms of ethics that are fit for an age of
intelligent machines is widely discussed [21].
These rich dialogues identify numerous ethical issues
that may be germane to smart home health technologies,
but is largely missing the views of those engineers who
work in smart-home research. Orr’s [22] fascinating
ethnography of the working lives of photocopier techni-
cians notwithstanding, studies that probe the views and
opinions of the engineering community are a relatively
slim volume in academic literature, particularly studies
of ethical issues [23–25]. Nonetheless their views may be
important for a number of reasons. Smart-home re-
searchers play a key role in the inception and implemen-
tation of new technologies, and their ethical perspectives
may be expected to influence the way ethical problems
are responded to. Within a general context this informs
a description of the approach of engineering scholars to
ethical issues which may directly inform pedagogical or
governance perspectives. This task fits within our own
empirical bioethics perspective. We are a group of re-
searchers from a variety of academic disciplines, the ma-
jority of whom have experience of conducting qualitative
studies in order to stimulate (bio-)ethical dialogue about
practical situations. Such dialogue may contribute insights
useful both to theoretical and practical perspectives. More
specifically, these insights might be critically analysed to ex-
plore both the problems that are identified and the efficacy
of the solutions that are offered to them. While empirical
ethics has a rich methodological tradition, [26] the current
project takes the relatively modest approach of offering
(bio)ethical reflection on the results of a qualitative study we
undertook with smart-home engineers. Such an approach,
in line with current attempts to foster responsible research
and innovation at a European level, [27] aims to contribute
to existing dialogue between applied ethicists (including
those within our own bioethics community) and the engin-
eering community. The intention is that this will contribute
to the ethical rigor of the solutions developed in this area.
Methods
To investigate the views of smart-home researchers, a quali-
tative interview study (hereafter “the qualitative study”) was
undertaken with researchers on a large project (hereafter
“the smart-home project”) concerned with the utilisation of
smart-home technologies. To maintain the anonymity of
participants we do not identify the smart-home project. It is
a large, interdisciplinary research collaboration involving
more than 80 academics and support staff at several UK
universities including early-, mid- and late-career re-
searchers (respectively defined for this study as PhD
students and research associates; lecturers and research
fellows; and readers and professors). By examining large sets
of data for relationships and patterns (data mining) using
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aims to address a range of health needs, harnessing existing
monitoring technologies that can be deployed in the average
home, including depth cameras, wearable devices and envir-
onmental sensors. The smart-home project aims to install
these technologies in tens of homes, using this experience to
create a smart-home health platform that is fit for real world
purposes.
Ethical approval to conduct the qualitative study of the
researchers and to the publication of anonymised
quotations was sought and given by the Faculty Research
Ethics Committees at the host Universities.
Sampling
All early and mid-career researchers in the smart-home
project with an engineering role in technology develop-
ment and deployment were eligible for inclusion, includ-
ing PhD students, research associates, research fellows
and lecturers. The study intended to explore perceptions
of social and ethical issues in the smart-home research
and we sought to understand the views of researchers
who were directly involved in the detail of the design
and implementation of smart-home health technologies
rather than those who are responsible for the project
direction as a whole. We therefore invited early- and
mid-career researchers to take part. A list of staff mem-
bers was provided by the smart-home project adminis-
trator; the list gave staff roles, position and contact
details. Approaches were made to potential participants
in waves of recruitment, with the aim of achieving a
sample of researchers who specialised in different tech-
nologies. In total thirty researchers were approached, of
whom twenty consented to be interviewed.
Recruitment
Potential participants were approached by email, by let-
ter or in person and given information about the qualita-
tive study. Potential participants were invited to contact
the interviewer (GB) if they were interested in being
interviewed or if they did not wish to take part. Unless
they indicated otherwise, those who did not respond to
the initial approach were re-contacted in later waves of
recruitment. Recruitment was continued until thematic
saturation was reached, understood as the point at
which no new themes are judged by the researchers to
be arising from the interviews [28].
Potential participants were also familiarised with the
qualitative study through a range of activities. The chief
investigator (RGH) and the interviewer (GB) attended
smart-home project meetings and used them as oppor-
tunities to publicise the qualitative study. To ensure that
potential participants had the chance to be aware of the
researcher and the kind of work he did before deciding
whether to not to take part, GB spent time working at adesk in the smart-home project offices. Towards the end
of the qualitative study GB gave a seminar to smart-
home project researchers about his other work in ethics
research, and before the final two interviews he led a
workshop with smart-home project researchers explor-
ing some ethical considerations relating to smart-home
technologies and public health measures.
Consent
Potential participants who expressed an interest in being
interviewed either met with the interviewer in person or
spoke with the interviewer using Skype. The interviewer
discussed the qualitative study and what participation
would involve with the potential participant and an-
swered any questions. If the potential participant agreed
to be interviewed they were asked to sign a consent
form, which included consent for the interview to be
audio-recorded and consent for extracts from transcrip-
tions of these recordings to be published. Participants
were reminded they could withdraw their consent at any
time during or after the interview.
Data collection
Once consent had been provided, a one-to-one, in-depth,
semi-structured interview took place. Participants were
asked to describe their role and experiences of the smart-
home project, and encouraged to offer ethical consider-
ations that they thought germane to broader smart-home
design beyond the confines of the immediate project. Areas
that seemed pertinent to the qualitative research topic were
explored in greater depth. The interview was guided by a
topic guide (included in Additional file 1), which indicated
major topic areas the interview would explore, and also
provided four vignettes, which were designed to facilitate
discussion of key topics should they not arise elsewhere in
the interview. All participants agreed to have their interview
audio-recorded, and these recordings were transcribed by a
university approved transcribing service. Transcripts were
compared with the interview audio for accuracy and cor-
rections made by the interviewer where necessary.
Participant characteristics
Twenty participants agreed to be interviewed before the-
matic saturation was reached. Fifteen of these were men
and five were women. Participants were of eight different
nationalities including British. Participants included four
PhD students, thirteen Research Associates, one Lecturer
and two Research Fellows. Seven participants were in-
volved in data mining, data fusion or pattern recognition.
The remaining thirteen worked on specific sensors or de-
ployment platforms. Nine participants had spent less than
two years working on the project, and the remainder more
than two years. Sixteen were from the lead university in
the project, with other centres contributing three and one
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79 min. Four interviews were conducted by Skype, and
the rest were conducted face-to-face.
In publishing these results we are particularly con-
cerned to maximise anonymity of participants. Partici-
pant area of expertise is pertinent to the themes, and
several quotes are included where this information is
given either in the quote or in the discussion. This ele-
vates an already high risk of participant identification
within a small research community, even when the usual
steps to preserve anonymity, such as pseudonymisation,
are taken. Even if widespread identification was impos-
sible, if participants are able to self-identify, this may
both undermine the consent that participants have given
to have extracts from the interviews published and more
generally undermine the confidence of participants in
further studies of this type. For this reason, further steps
have been taken to increase anonymity; described below.
Enhancing anonymity
No table of participants is given, as details such as occupa-
tion, grade and length of time on the smart-home project
would lead to recognition. Given the presence of identify-
ing features in some quotes, simple pseudonyms were
found to provide inadequate protection of participants’
identities. However, removal of pseudonyms decreased the
readability of the paper and, further, may give inadequate
reassurance to readers that quotes from a narrow pool of
participants did not dominate the discussion. Nor did re-
moving pseudonyms provide easy traceability between the
authors when writing the article. Therefore each partici-
pant was assigned two possible pseudonyms, which were
securely stored on an encrypted keybreaker table. The
cluster ensured that quotes from each participant featured
no more than twice in this article, allowed traceability and
enhanced readability. Name genders reflected the gender
balance of researchers on the smart-home project, but
gender was assigned at random to decrease researcher
identifiability further. Finally we do not give precise or dir-
ectly identifying details of the smart-home project in the
text of this article, although we are aware that it could be
identified by other means. This is primarily because we
felt that anonymising the study was a sign of good faith to
participants, but also because many discussions in the in-
terviews are about considerations that were broader than
the project itself and did not directly reflect the solutions
that were adopted within the project.
Data analysis
Transcripts were analysed using the method of thematic
analysis described by Braun and Clarke [29]. Individual
transcripts were read and, using NVivo 10, inductive codes
were assigned to portions of text by the first author (GB). A
total of twenty per cent of transcripts were independentlycoded by a second member of the study team (RGH, MM,
RH, RtM) and codes were checked for consistency. Incon-
sistent codes were discussed until consensus was reached.
When coding was complete, 37 codes had arisen from the
text. Similar codes were then grouped into broader themes,
which described concepts or understandings that recurred
in many interviews. Text that contributed to these themes
was re-read in context to ensure the topics reflected the
content of the interviews. Quotes that exemplified these
themes were selected, lightly edited for readability and par-
ticipants given pseudonyms.
Results
Two themes arising from the analysis are discussed here.
The first, ‘privacy’, encompassed smart-home project re-
searchers’ discussions about the desirability of personal
privacy, the necessity for the privacy of end-users of the
technology and the reasons for this. The second theme,
‘choice’ focused on the paradox between solving ethical
dilemmas in research by allowing end-users freedom to
choose, and the need to ultimately impose ethical
judgments that limited end-users’ choices.
Privacy
Privacy is a “volatile and controversial concept” [30], and
is thus difficult to define in a way that satisfies all
reasonable objections. Nevertheless, there are clear soci-
etal norms protecting personal privacy, even if their
boundaries are debated. One taxonomy of invasions of
privacy includes:
the collection, storage, and computerization of
information; the dissemination of information about
individuals; peeping, following, watching, and
photographing individuals; intruding or entering
“private” places; eavesdropping, wiretapping, reading
of letters; drawing attention to individuals; and forced
disclosure of information [31].
Encouraged to speculate on the problems and possibil-
ities of smart-home technologies, issues germane to
privacy arose frequently in the interviews. In particular,
smart-home project researchers predominantly charac-
terise privacy as the unbidden sharing of data, rather
than as an invasion of personal space.
Researchers vary in their concern about privacy: several
indicate they are relaxed about their own privacy. For
example, Julian thinks that the loss of privacy is a ‘done
deal’, and therefore, not an important worry:
Julian: if you’ve got a mobile phone, I think people can
track you if they really want to. Indeed, I think there
are apps where you can, in fact, track your child’s or
your partner’s phone, so you do know where they are.
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is? I’m not too worried about that.
Similarly, Brian suggests he is relaxed about large-scale
commercial collection of personal data:
Brian: Actually, Google products are really good. If you use
them you get a lot of benefit from having - and actually do
I really care about what they’re doing with my data? It’s
not like that they’re looking at my data personally.
These responses conceptualise privacy as access to
data, and suggest the participants may not contextualise
quite distant, person-neutral, corporate information col-
lection as problematic in privacy terms. Even where
more personal notes are struck, privacy is often consid-
ered in terms of data, rather than in more abstract
terms, like being watched. For instance, Margaret and
Sally, both researchers who specialise in video technolo-
gies, contend that researchers in their field are less sensi-
tive about being filmed in the course of their research
than others:
Margaret: To be honest I think maybe [video
researchers] are less sensitive than other people. For
video we really want to get that data and we think it
is really okay, so if you put it in my home I am okay
with it. … I would be okay with [other sensors too].
Sally offers a similar reflection, which seemed to
corroborate this suggestion:
Sally: I’m a [video researcher] and for years we’ve been
videoing each other hopping and walking up and
down and I truthfully don’t care if there’s a picture of
me doing that in a conference paper at all. There
needs to be some balance I think. It’s frustrating as
well because I know other research groups don’t do
that [gain research approval].
Although Margaret and Sally’s willingness to share im-
ages of themselves in research contexts could, on the
face of it, speak of a relaxed approach to being watched,
their aims regarding sharing suggest that imaging is
again linked to data privacy. Margaret links video to the
need for data, while Sally is relaxed about sharing video
at a conference of herself moving, as this takes place in
a research context. There is no contrast with this data-
centred conception of privacy when Sally and Margaret
express strong resistance to sharing other types of infor-
mation about themselves with others: the focus is again
on sharing data, rather than on sharing prompting more
emotive responses (such as feeling exposed). Discussing
her resistance to sharing location data, Sally says:Sally: A lot of people [share location data] all the time
but then you can look at people, you can tell what
time they leave work, if they’ve left early, you can see
where they go afterwards. I think they’re potty to leave
that thing running. … I suppose I just don’t want
people knowing exactly where I am at what time of the
day. …the journey to and from there and the journey
from home to work, I don’t want those patterns of my
behaviour being public.
Similarly, when asked to talk about the types of sen-
sors that might make her uneasy if used outside the pro-
ject, Margaret expresses concern about sensors that
recorded the voice:
Margaret: For me I probably don’t like voice sensors in
there to record the environmental voice in it.
Interviewer: So recording speech and so on.
Margaret: Yes, the speech things. It is just a personal
[thing] for me. I think somehow it is also difficult to
process that data. Sometimes people say something and
you don’t really want to process that data. Maybe it is
better than having the voice recognition system at home
or those constrained environment is probably better for
users otherwise they have this and they probably think,
“Every single word I say will be recorded.” It will always
make them think, “That data has to be recorded should
I say something?” They always need to think about this
so it will probably affect their life.
Margaret and Sally’s reflections are interesting because
their desire not to be located or audio-recorded relates
to the unbidden sharing or storage of data. Sharing video
is tolerated because it is innocuous data. Location is un-
acceptable if it is shared with the public. These concerns
about data privacy were visible in a range of discussion
of specific technologies, including less overtly intrusive
smart-home technologies, such as door sensors, noise
detectors or, as in the following examples, accelerome-
ters and electricity usage monitors:
Norman: if someone has access to, let’s say, that
data, and he sees you made 2,000 steps, it means if
you were home, you’re somewhere else now, because
you cannot walk 2,000 steps in your home at a
single time.
Derek: The reason I don’t like all this data collection is
just because I’m a data mining researcher. I know what
they can do with the data. … [for example] I can simply
use the electricity metering to detect whether someone
has played their PlayStation. … [to detect that] this guy
is playing video games for the whole night.
Birchley et al. BMC Medical Ethics  (2017) 18:23 Page 6 of 13Nevertheless, despite the ubiquity of concerns about
keeping data private, some researchers express concerns
about privacy at a more visceral level. For example, Gabriel
articulates resistance to the idea of deployment of any
smart-home technology in his own home, stating it would
invade his privacy since the home should be a space where
Gabriel: I can escape from the entire world, and also
from the invigilation.
Such statements are more consistent with a funda-
mental desire for physical privacy, and this attitude
seems to be replicated by other researchers, especially
those who express reservations about using the tech-
nologies in their own homes:
Dexter: I don’t want a camera in my house … I don’t like
the wearable as well. I don’t like it at all. No, I don’t.
Interviewer: For what reason don’t you like it?
Dexter: Because, in the home, I just feel like it’s a
constraint, too many constraints.
Interviewer: Right. So it’s aesthetic for you?
Dexter: Yes. I don’t feel comfortable wearing one thing all
day. Once you participate you feel that you have to use it.
Despite Dexter’s agreement with the suggestion that
his dislike of a wristband is aesthetic, his final response
clearly relies on a notion of physical privacy. There is no
suggestion of discomfort at sharing information, the dis-
comfort is more visceral, an invasion of the object into
Dexter’s physical space and routines. Similarly Aiden
avers cameras are problematic because:
Aiden: I guess is deeply rooted in the fact that someone
has an idea that there is someone on the other side
just watching at all times.
These extracts contain the sort of intuitive expressions
of discomfort that may arise from being watched or
followed, but privacy is most often discussed in terms of
information. When invited to speculate beyond their im-
mediate project, researchers clearly see privacy as a
major issue in smart-home research, and are alert to the
negative consequences of unauthorised sharing of infor-
mation. This is unsurprising in one sense, because en-
suring informational privacy has the appearance of a
tractable problem. On the other hand, physical privacy is
much more difficult to address. If potential users of
smart-home technologies ‘just feel’ uncomfortable with
being monitored by the technology, it is unclear if and
how a focus on informational privacy could address the
problem. This issue shall be explored further in the
discussion section.Choice
Privacy is a concept that appears to be linked to no-
tions of consent, so it is unsurprising that ‘choice’
emerges as a second major theme in the interviews.
Researchers often appeal to end-user choice to solve
the ethical dilemmas inherent in ensuring privacy
(and beyond). However a commitment to end-user
choice does not sit comfortably with researchers’ roles
in defining the boundaries of these choices. Re-
searchers’ discussion of their own choices, which im-
plies certain moral standpoints, and how these might
influence—or even constrain—the choices the end-
users made, sometimes sharply contradict commit-
ment to end-user choice.
End-user choices
Researchers frequently invoke provision of choice to
end-users in order to circumvent ethically challenging
issues, which were in the majority of cases issues ger-
mane to privacy. These might be general questions of
what data to share; for instance, Angela describes a
model where end-users ‘opt in’ to particular smart-home
technologies:
Angela: We provide this, and the end-users should
choose about their home, what data they would like to
provide. Like GPS is available on my phone, but I can
turn it off. When I want some service based on that, I
turn it on.
In a similar way, Frank appeals to the concept of
choice to resolve a personal privacy issue raised by the
question of whether to store personal data within the
end-user’s home or online:
Frank: [how to solve data storage issues] depends on
the people. Some people would prefer to send [data]
online and don’t want to see anybody coming into
their house and other people would prefer to keep it
there and let people in to check it. If people can have a
choice, that will be the best plan.
A further, contentious, issue within the project was the
acceptability of recording video images. As we have seen
in the first theme collecting video was contentious
among some researchers because of privacy concerns,
but those in favour argued end-user choice could justify
collection of this type of data:
Elsie: Some users might not even want the camera
in their home, so we can’t put the whole thing in
their homes. I think that really depends on what
the user wants. If they said okay then we are happy
to put it in.
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ment: ethical problems, especially of privacy, could poten-
tially be dissolved if an end-user chose to share their data.
Indeed, some researchers take choice to imply responsibility:
for example, Oliver suggests the dilemma of gaining consent
for (inadvertent) data collection from third parties can be
left with the end-user:
Oliver: If you have third party children coming into
the house obviously their guardian would have to say
if this is okay or not. It is very difficult. It will probably
have to be then on the [end-user]’s shoulders to bear
that burden to tell people and inform people. I think it
is really difficult.
On the other hand, some researchers state that per-
sonal choice can only go so far. For instance, Godfrey
avers that, because a smart-home system could hypo-
thetically indiscriminately monitor anyone who was in
that smart-home, the nature of smart-home projects ex-
poses the notion of end-user choice to wider problems:
Godfrey: [end-users] can say, “I am going to record my
own self doing anything I happen to feel like. And I
can do that for my own personal ends; whatever those
personal ends might happen to me. And that is
completely my choice.” And that is legally, if not
ethically uncomplicated. The problem becomes when
[end-users] have a family and things like that and
then you blur the boundaries of what is personal.
Godfrey indicates that the special problems of dealing with
the multiple occupants and visitors, who might include chil-
dren or non-consenting adults, mean that choice is much
more dynamic than simply allowing individual end-users to
choose their preference. Firstly, since choices needed to be
made before the implementation of the system, research
choices are potentially a major conduit for researchers’ own
value judgements. Secondly, even if there is clear evidence of
particular end-user choices, these could not be unrestricted.
As detailed in the first theme (‘privacy’), many researchers
are concerned that a smart-home environment has hypothet-
ical potential to broadcast data that would damage the end-
user if shared in an unrestricted way; as such it is logical that
sharing is prevented, even if that prevention brings the
choices of end-users and researchers into conflict.
Making research choices
Researchers voiced near unanimous support for end-
user choice to be the arbiter of ethical dilemmas. But
researchers also had to make choices about selection,
design and implementation of technologies and these by
their very nature imply that ethical choices are being
made. While these might be framed as choices of apurely technical nature, or choices driven by others, at
some stage the researcher themselves has to make basic
choices that, plausibly, would affect the ultimate direc-
tion of the project. Blake summarises this succinctly:
Blake: Well, in research, you make your own choices.
You decide whether you use this technique or
something else, and so on.
While such an explanation does not explicitly address
ethical issues, certain aspects of design clearly took a (very
standard) ethical position. For instance, consider this explan-
ation by Gwen of the way the home network was designed:
Gwen: …if you have a physical network, you don’t
really need to encrypt because you just have a cable
between device A and device B. Whereas, if you’re
using a wireless link, then you definitely have to
encrypt data. That basically slows things down, so an
advantage of using a wired link is that you can
possibly avoid having to encrypt anything. Therefore,
you can increase the speed of your storage system.
Gwen assumes data security—either based on encryp-
tion or the inherent features of a closed circuit—to be
embedded in design. An ethical choice is made that (for
example) there is a duty to end-users to keep data se-
cure. While this is clearly a choice that is bulwarked by
societal mores, regulatory norms, the law, and research
ethics, it should nevertheless not be overlooked that the
opposite choice can be made. It is open to researchers to
decide that data is not personally identifiable, and data
security can be relaxed. Indeed, it is not uncommon for
researchers to report taking such a position, for instance:
Phoebe: The wristband is basically just accelerometer
counts of my hands swinging around as I move
around. Maybe it’s got location data that coarsely says
which room I’m in in my own home, which is pretty
meaningless.
Carter: I know for a fact that there’s absolutely, well,
nothing they can know about me that I really don’t
want them to know. The microphone is not able to
record sound or send a sound anywhere else. The
accelerometer data is literally just accelerometer data
and at the end of the day there’s really only so much
you can find out from that. You can’t really find out if
someone is doing any specified task.
Yet, while researchers tend to defer to research guide-
lines in spite of such value judgements, some ethical
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stage. For instance, should the project focus on tech-
nologies with a high risk of personal identifiability (like
video)? Where is the balance between gathering valuable
data and user acceptability? What is practical? What is
relevant? Some of these questions about what should be
monitored had been put to clinicians, but Florence high-
lights the ultimate need for researchers to discover what
information to gather:
Interviewer: Presumably you’re collecting this data
because clinicians have said that this type of data
would be useful?
Florence: Yes. That’s a question for us, as well. In the
very beginning, we didn’t know, even though we had a
literature review. Many literature said that’s a
wearable sensor, so you can use it to detect that kind
of activity. Daily activity. But that’s not a strong
conclusion to say that we need these sensors, these
sensors, and that this list of sensors can give you this
list of activity recognition.
Interviewer: So you’re almost collecting data to see
what you can find out.
Florence: That’s one of the tasks we need to do. We
deploy a list of sensors, to see which one, what list of
sensors is actually useful to detect the daily living
activity of the user.
Florence’s comments point toward a paradox of experi-
mental research. To decide what to monitor, the re-
searcher must first start monitoring. While discussions
with clinicians and the public could be useful to guide
these decisions, the researchers explain that some guess-
work was always needed. For example, Connor indicates
the need for researchers to anticipate what end-users
would accept:
Connor: Basically, we are basing our choices on the
fact that we think that the [end-users] that volunteer
are happy to do that.
Connor’s comment contains an echo of the earlier ap-
peal to end-user choice. Indeed, design choices are not
framed as explicitly restrictive of ethical choices, but
simply technical decisions. Nonetheless, as stated earlier,allowing end-users to follow their preferences in unre-
stricted ways is ultimately problematic for some re-
searchers, and leads to discussion of controls on end-
user behaviour, although such controls are rarely, if ever,
made explicit to end-users.
Influencing end-user choice
In some instances, researchers describe decisions that
had been explicitly made to prevent end-users from
making ‘bad’ choices. Sometimes these were framed, as
above, as technical decisions, but these technical consid-
erations merge with clear intentions to prevent users
from acting in certain ways. At a whole-project level the
smart-home project would not store ‘raw’ data as
collected by sensors. Instead, such data would be proc-
essed immediately by the system (a server) within the
home into higher-level data, and the system in the home
would not be connected to the wider internet beyond
the home. In the following exchange, Seth justifies re-
strictions to end-user access to processed data, because
access may cause them to reflect negatively on their
actions:
Seth: [end-users] shouldn’t have access [to their data].
Because when you look at your own data, you feel like
you didn’t do very well.
Other researchers suggest that end-user data should
be shared with health professionals, but that the decision
about what to share should rest with researchers, rather
than the end-user themselves:
Austin: But I think the user isn’t necessarily to be the
one to decide what data they will share.
As with Mia’s statements about allowing users to
record video, such questions could still conceivably
be framed as technical choices, so rightly in the
ambit of researchers to make. However several re-
searchers assert that end-users may use the technol-
ogy for ethically suspect purposes. Roger is among
several researchers who found the possibility that
parents could hypothetically use smart-home tech-
nology to monitor their children’s behaviour ethically
troubling:
Roger: [a smart-home system] would really have to be
well thought out to avoid misuse … let’s say that you’re
living with your children in such a house that you can
monitor their every step. I think that’s not appropriate,
or that’s not ethical. You would not want your children
to behave good because you’re monitoring them, but
you want them to behave in a good way because that’s
the right thing to do.
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sentiments that proposed end-user choice—and the wider
principles of end-user consent—as a justification for the col-
lection and sharing of personal data. Yet, allowing end-user
choice remains important for most researchers. For one
thing, researchers perceive difficulties in preventing end-
users from using the system as they choose. As Leon says:
Leon: I think [poor end-user choices are] the concern of
the project, yes. I think it’s very difficult to force people.
Not only that it might be ethically questionable, but I
think it’s technically difficult to force them not to use
the system in this way, or that way.
Thus, with regard to the dilemma of monitoring their
own children, Elliot states that end-users, armed with
the correct information, would make the right choice
about their monitoring their children:
Elliot: I mean, we should still want these people to
choose what the right thing is for them on their own
free will.
Interviewer: Right, so you want people to make the
right choice?
Elliot: We should give the information so they are able
to make the right choice.
Elliot’s appeal, framed using the language of informa-
tion, choice and free-will, closely traces the conceptual
language of consent, and emphasises researchers’ reluc-
tance to impose choices overtly on end-users, even
where a need to minimise end-user’s choices to ethically
acceptable options is asserted.
Choice was a major area of discussion in the interviews.
Many researchers suggest that end-user choice might solve
ethical dilemmas; indeed, given the preponderance of re-
searchers favouring end-user choice as a way to solve eth-
ical dilemmas, this may suggest a libertarian slant toward
their thinking. Nevertheless researchers also indicate that
end-user choices can be restricted. Such restriction is al-
most always done covertly, through design, rather than in
ways that might overtly challenge the notion of end-user
choice. The values of researchers might be channelled into
the basic design choices they make, but the ethical dimen-
sion of design was rarely acknowledged. The implications
of this and the previous theme are discussed below.
Discussion
The views and experiences of smart-home researchers
indicate that privacy and choice are their major areas of
ethical concern. Their approaches can be analysed by
asking two major ethical questions, which we invite
smart-home researchers to reflect upon:1. Researchers identify privacy as a major concern in
the conduct of research, yet tend to see privacy in
terms of informational privacy, and only rarely see
privacy as physical privacy. Is this focus on data
privacy appropriate?
Although some form of respect for privacy is a global
societal norm, whether and where privacy can coherently
be termed a moral concept is deeply contested [32],
since respect for privacy explicitly places restrictions on
enforcing other moral claims. Perhaps because of this
contested moral value, moral claims based on privacy
are at the heart of many polarised bioethical debates
[30]. Philosophical debates about privacy centre on
whether privacy is an interest in its own right (and thus
is vulnerable to harms), or instead a cluster of other
more basic interests, such as property interests and lib-
erty interests [33]. Privacy is clearly addressed in law; in
England and Wales, the Article 8 right to respect for
privacy and family life of the Human Rights Act 1998,
the Data Protection Act 1998 and the Regulation of In-
vestigatory Powers Act 2000 are important contempor-
ary statutory examples. Legal discussion that dates back
to the 19th century [34] indicates the longstanding
(though sometimes problematic) place of privacy in
culture.
While various typologies of privacy exist, the way that
privacy was discussed by smart-home researchers can be
seen to follow a division of privacy into ‘physical priva-
cy’—avoiding unwanted sensory access—and ‘informa-
tional privacy’—avoiding the misuse of information [35,
36]. In support of such a division, NA Moreham [36]
makes the plausible claim that watching or following a
person breaches their privacy even if no information is
obtained or circulated. Setting aside the philosophical
debates that this claim invites, there is a clear practical
implication for those working in this field. Viewing re-
searchers’ discussions of privacy through the lens of in-
formational and physical privacy gives insight into the
challenge of developing and delivering home monitoring
technology to members of the public. Maintaining infor-
mational privacy may appear to be a tractable challenge,
given the advanced state of technologies such as encryp-
tion. Moreover, by isolating networks from the internet,
basing servers in the home and so forth, the researchers
had made considerable efforts to reduce the likelihood
of unauthorised data sharing. While there is always some
possibility of unanticipated data breaches, researchers
were concerned to identify and avoid such possibilities.
Concerns about physical privacy appear to be less
tractable than concerns about informational privacy.
These concerns therefore pose perhaps a greater threat
to the uptake of smart-home technologies, and, in the
short term, to delivering smart-home technology to
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The positive levels of user acceptance of sensing tech-
nologies seen in some studies [37] have limited value
due to their small scale. Research has also tended to
focus on people living with long-term conditions [38],
who may react more positively than those less invested
in monitoring their health; by contrast, a third of users
of wearable health technologies stop using these prod-
ucts within six months [39]. Moreover, research has fo-
cused on discrete technologies [40, 41] rather than the
ubiquitous sensors and monitoring devices envisaged as
the end-point of smart-homes. End-users’ responses to
these technologies in the field have much to tell us.
Some studies of end-users suggest that unobtrusiveness
and invisibility are valued at least as highly as assurances
of informational privacy [42]. Such tendencies toward
physical privacy may manifest in the rejection of some
or all types of smart-home monitoring that cannot be
overcome by reassurances about data protection. Quite
how these issues can be solved in the context of smart-
homes ultimately demands input both from the people
who use their technologies and those who actively reject
such technologies, about how they feel. Until this is
investigated, we should be wary of overestimating what
can be achieved with data privacy.
2. Researchers saw offering end-user choice as an
effective way of addressing ethically sensitive issues,
but also acknowledged end-user choices should be
restricted in some instances. How much choice
should end-users be offered?
Writers often link choice to autonomy, and both
healthcare ethics [43, 44] and the ethics of research par-
ticipation are concerned with patient or participant
choice. Some bioethicists reduce most ethical dilemmas
to respect for autonomy [43]. They justify this position
by referring to a plurality of values and the lack of an
overarching moral consensus. However, this position is
often guided by libertarian motives and extreme em-
phasis on individual freedom [45]. In this case, they
might argue that, if individual can agree with the intru-
sion of their life sphere, there is no ethical issue any
more. In our study, researchers’ inclination to offer
choice to future end-users could be interpreted in two
ways. First, as described in the results section, reducing
ethical dilemmas to choice could allow smart-home re-
searchers to avoid taking responsibility for ethical deci-
sions. Second, the desire to offer choice may relate to a
libertarian approach to end-user choice in which choice
is seen as a completely individual process in which no
others are (or should be) involved. The first of these is
more pragmatic in orientation and the second is a more
principled basis for provision of choice. Both possibilitiesmay operate alongside each other, or in an intertwined
manner, which accords with research in other contexts.
For instance, Mol observed that the rhetoric of autono-
mous choice in healthcare can be interpreted both as ra-
tionale by practitioners to excuse themselves from
caring about the patient who makes choices and as prin-
cipled (we would say libertarian) respect for those pa-
tient choices [46].
The nature of privacy is “one of the most obvious and
pressing issues in computer ethics” [47] and a vexed one
in ubiquitous computing [48]. If the researchers in this
study largely endorse the thesis that choice can resolve
ethical issues (whether for principled or self-serving rea-
sons), it is germane to ask how choice might relate to per-
sonal privacy. The close identification of privacy with
choice is only reflected in some areas of existing literature,
mainly in context of U.S. constitutional law and related
academic literature, where privacy has been argued to
underpin rights to autonomy [49]. However, many writers
have not taken this approach, [50] for instance,
Nissenbaum [32] argues that personal privacy is measured
by degree of access rather than degree of choice. Similarly,
Cate suggests, “individual choice is not the same as per-
sonal privacy, so focusing laws, regulations and enforce-
ment on the former will not necessarily enhance the
latter.” [51]. Cate also argues that a focus on choice allows
data collectors to shirk their obligations to maintain priv-
acy, shifting responsibilities in relation to privacy onto the
individuals who provide the data. This analysis suggests
that an inappropriate focus on choice may also raise social
justice concerns. Furthermore, asking end-users to make
frequent choices about participation (which we may wish
to do in smart homes, with their perpetual monitoring)
may place excessive burden on individuals [51, 52]. Other
contexts where patients and consumers are routinely pre-
sented with choices, such as informed consent documents,
terms of credit documents or software terms-of-use con-
tracts have been empirically demonstrated to result in
poor exchange and understanding of information [53].
Therefore, offering choice may not be the solution to priv-
acy issues, may place burden on individuals, may not en-
hance understanding and may raise social justice
concerns.
The imperfections in ensuring privacy by providing
more choice may be behind the tensions about the role
and extent of choice within the interviews. By disconnect-
ing choice from personal privacy we might begin to ex-
plore what other benefits and harms flow from choice (a
number of which were identified by researchers). Possible
benefits may include a feeling of reassurance to end-users
that a smart-home system is delivered in a professional
manner and the sense that they are able to withdraw if use
of the system is burdensome. Possible harms that should
be guarded against include giving end-users the ability to
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consent, disenfranchisement if end-users are given infor-
mation that they do not understand, and negative impact
on end-users if they are provided with access to data
about themselves without interpretation and support.
These harms could be serious, and may be justifiable rea-
sons for restriction of some choices to end-users. Such re-
strictions should be monitored to ensure appropriateness
and carefully balanced against possible benefit of broader
choices, informed by ethical reflection on the meaning of
privacy as a widely shared value. By decoupling choice
from privacy, the duty to protect the privacy of end-users
and third parties is placed more firmly with researchers.
Limitations
The study has some limitations. The lead researcher was
not a smart-home engineer and thus may have interpreted
technical distinctions in a naïve way. However, this naïvety
is generally considered an advantage in qualitative research,
since the researcher investigates basic assumptions. The
participants were early- and mid- career researchers and so
the material presented here accurately reflects their views
rather than decisions about the smart-home project as a
whole, which are not explored within this study. However,
the study is intended to reflect on smart-home research in
general rather than on particular solutions adopted in a sin-
gle project. The study only investigates the views of the re-
searchers and not of the end-users, and it will be important
to gather the views of end-users to be able to compare the
views of users and engineers. We recruited from a single
smart-home project, and it is possible that the micro-
culture does not reflect experiences in other projects. As
study participation was voluntary it is possible that the re-
searchers who took part had particularly keen or specific
interest in the topics that the study addressed. Despite this
we have confidence in the findings because we encountered
diverse opinions and were able to include participants from
several institutions. We appreciate that interviewing and
thematic analysis are subjective processes, and it is possible
that other researchers would have encountered different
themes. However, we conducted interviews and analysis
until thematic saturation was achieved, and the process of
analysis included double coding and deliberative discus-
sions within our experienced multi-disciplinary research
group. We therefore suggest that the interpretation pre-
sented here is appropriate and germane to the developing
research in this area.
Conclusions
Applying smart-home technologies to healthcare appli-
cations represents not only a technical, but an ethical,
challenge. Ethical analyses of these technologies raise
concerns inter alia about loss of privacy, the adequacy
of consent and maintaining agency. Exploring the viewsand experiences of researchers of smart-home technolo-
gies brings insights into which ethical issues researchers
see as pertinent to their technologies, and the ap-
proaches that they take to solve these issues.
Qualitative interviews with researchers in this large,
multi-centre smart-home project indicated that privacy
and choice were the major areas of ethical focus in the de-
sign and implementation of smart-home health technolo-
gies. Researchers primarily viewed privacy as a problem of
data security, and expended efforts to develop a system
that would minimise the exposure of data to the outside
world. Laudable as such an approach is, a focus on data
privacy may take too little account of the much less tract-
able problem of ensuring end-users felt that their physical
privacy was respected. While actual respect is clearly eth-
ically important, favourable end-user perceptions are es-
sential to public acceptability of new technologies and
thus ensuring that their benefits are spread equitably. Even
where researchers were able to ensure adequate data priv-
acy, the lack of a commonly agreed concept of privacy
could mean that, even with sustained attention, privacy is
limited in its solubility as an ethical problem. Essential to
developing approaches to these problems will be to con-
tinue research with those end-users who both engage, and
do not engage, with smart home technologies.
Researchers also indicated considerable efforts in en-
suring end-user choice were addressed in the system de-
sign. Many saw this as a ready solution that addresses
many of the ethical problems involved in maintaining
privacy. At the same time, the interviews revealed aware-
ness among researchers of the limitations of this strat-
egy, and despite an overwhelming endorsement of the
moral desirability of user choice many researchers dis-
cussed elements of design which restricted such choice.
Researchers tended to describe these as technical solu-
tions to engineering problems, and did not seem to ex-
plore or question the normative assumptions that
accompanied them. Researchers overtly discussed re-
striction of end-user choice in only a few cases and even
then, with extensive caveats. This may point to a desire
to avoid making ethical choices, but might equally be
consistent with a pro-autonomy position. Choice may
then, be a way to address ethical issues. Nevertheless,
given the pervasiveness of privacy concerns in ubiqui-
tous computing, it is notable that identification of priv-
acy with choice is not a ethically acceptable strategy.
Indeed some privacy scholars suggest it misidentifies the
sources of privacy and risks the unjust burdening of
end-users with a problem that researchers themselves
have greater resources to address. Such analysis suggests
that considering choice and privacy as separate issues is
likely to result in a more satisfactory treatment of both.
Our research aimed to document the perspectives of re-
searchers in a rapidly developing technological field. We
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(bio)ethics can be a critical partner to smart-home engin-
eering. We suggest that some of the possible ‘critical’ roles
of the ethicist in such a partnership could be to identify
the moral issues, to help to resolve them, to point at issues
that are intractable or difficult to resolve and to find
ethical justifications or express concerns. Such collabor-
ation between ethics and engineering is necessary to
develop solutions that are both technologically and
ethically robust in an area that is likely to be of increasing
importance in healthcare delivery.
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